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Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1996 & Supp. 2001)
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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:
:

v.

:

PEARL TOPANOTES,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No. 20010127-SC

Priority No. 13

:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & -2(5) (1996 &
Supp. 2001).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Given the preference for fact-sensitive issues to be addressed in the trial
court in the first instance, may Utah's appellate courts remand for consideration of
alternative grounds for affirmance involving, e.g., the inevitable discovery rule?
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "'the decision of the court of appeals, not
the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196. 1199 (Utah 1995). The
court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 L'T 80. *| 8.
13 P.3d576.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are at issue here.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner was charged with possession of heroin, a third degree felony (R7).
Thereafter, petitioner moved to suppress heroin seized during a warrantless search of her
person incident to her arrest on outstanding warrants (R29). Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R98:3-4) (a copy of the oral ruling is contained
in addendum B). Petitioner entered a conditional plea and was sentenced to an
indeterminate statutory term of zero-to-five years (R56-57; R60-66).
On direct appeal, the State conceded that under Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT
App 55, 998 P.2d 274, issued approximately eight months after the trial court's ruling,
the voluntary encounter between petitioner and police escalated to a detention when
police failed to return petitioner's identification before running a warrants check. State
v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, f 8, n.3, 914 P.2d 695 (a copy is contained in
addendum A). The State also conceded that the detention was not justified by
reasonable suspicion. Id. The court of appeals agreed. Id.
Notwithstanding, the State argued alternatively, that had the investigation
continued without the illegality, i.e., retaining petitioner's identification, police would
still have run the warrants check and inevitably discovered petitioner's outstanding

?

warrants. Therefore, the inevitable discovery rule justified admission of the heroin. Id.
at«I 10.
The court of appeals observed that because the State prevailed below, the factsensitive issue of inevitable discovery was not addressed in the trial court. Id. at *[ 11.
Thus, emphasizing that " ; [i]t is not the function of an appellate court to make findings of
fact because it does not have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses testify^]'"
the court of appeals remanded to the trial court *4for a factual determination on whether
the heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be
appropriate/' Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, atlfij 11-12 (citation omitted).
Petitioner timely sought certiorari review, which was granted on 18 July 2001.
See State v. Topanotes, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Several Salt Lake City police officers patrolled a known "prostitute track" on
North Temple, on 7 October 1998, and arrested prostitute Glennar1 Thomas (R88:7-13).
Salt Lake City police routinely attempt to confirm an arrested prostitute's actual residence
(R88:12-13). Accordingly, three officers, including Sgt. Hansen, and Officer Mitchell,
had Thomas take them to the trailer where she claimed to live with a girlfriend named
Pearl, a short Native American who Thomas said was also a prostitute (R88:8-9, 20).
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Officer Mitchell knocked on the trailer door, but received no response (R88:25).
He then talked to the owner of the home on the same property (id.). The homeowner
confirmed that a short Native American girl named Pearl lived in the trailer (R88:26).
As the officers were leaving the premises, Officer Mitchell saw petitioner walk by
and observed that she fit the homeowner's description of the girl that lived in the trailer
(R88:27). Sgt. Hansen also saw petitioner walking toward the trailer (R88:13). Sgt.
Hansen identified himself as a police officer and asked petitioner if she had any
identification (R88:10). When petitioner provided identification, Sgt. Hansen handed it
to Officer Mitchell and asked him to call it in for a warrants check (R88:10-14). The
warrants check was "routine procedure" (R88:16, 27), or "common practice" (R88:22).
While waiting for the warrants check to be completed, Sgt. Hansen attempted to confirm
with petitioner Thomas's identity -id residence (R88:11). The warrants check was
completed within five minutes and revealed two outstanding warrants for petitioner
(R88:22). She was arrested and a search incident thereto revealedJieroin on her person
{id.).
Although Thomas reported living with a prostitute named Pearl, Sgt. Hansen did
not "at that moment" suspect petitioner of any criminal activity (id.). Officer Mitchell
concurred that while they had information petitioner was a prostitute, they did not then
suspect of her soliciting (R88:28).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the court of appeals' committed error in
ordenng a remand here. Indeed, where, as in this inevitable discovery case, fact-sensitive
issues are involved, both this Court and the court of appeals have remanded for
consideration of alternative grounds for affirmance by the tnal court, including further
evidentiary heanng where necessary. Thus, the instant remand is consistent with the
Utah practice and should therefore be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
GIVEN THE PREFERENCE FOR FACT-SENSITIVE ISSUES TO
BE ADDRESSED IN THE TRIAL COURT IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE, UTAH'S APPELLATE COURTS MAY REMAND FOR
CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR
AFFIRMANCE INVOLVING, E.G., THE INEVITABLE
DISCOVERY RULE
The tnal court refused to suppress heroin discovered on defendant's person dunng
a search incident to her arrest on outstanding warrants (R98), add B Specifically, the
tnal court found that nothing occurred to escalate the voluntary encounter to a detention,
including the fact that police did not immediately return petitioner's identification, but
retained it while running the warrants check (R98:7), add. B. On appeal, the State
conceded, and the court of appeals agreed, that under Salt Lake City v* Ray, 2000 LT
App 55, *\ 13, 998 P.2d 274, issued approximately eight months after the tnal court's
ruling, police retention of petitioner's identification escalated the otherwise voluntary
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encounter to a detention requiring Fourth Amendment justification, which justification
was lacking here. State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311, «j 8, 14 P.3d 695.
Although the State argued that the court of appeals could alternatively affirm the
ruling below on the ground that police would have run the warrants check even without
petitioner's identification and thus would have inevitably, legally discovered the
outstanding warrants, the court of appeals declined to do so. Rather, noting its
preference for the trial court to make this fact-sensitive determination in the first
instance, the court of appeals remanded "for a factual determination on whether the
heroin would have been inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as may be
appropriate." Id. atff 11-12.
On certiorari, petitioner claims that the court of appeals' remand conflicts with
precedent from this Court and the court of appeals. Pet. Br. at 10-14. Petitioner's claims
of conflict are illusory and otherwise fail to demonstrate that the instant remand is
anything other than the Utah practice.
A.

Both This Court and the Court of Appeals Remand for
Consideration of Alternative Grounds for Affirmance Which
May Include Further Evidentiary Hearing When, as Here, the
Issues are Fact-Sensitive.

Petitioner complains that the court of appeals' broad remand is contrary to both
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc, 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969), where this Court
affirmed without remand on alternative grounds, and State v. Montoya 937 P.2d 145
(Utah App. 1997), where the court of appeals reversed without remand, declining to
6

atfirm on alternative grounds. Pet Br at 10-12 Petitioner suggests that an appellate
court must either affirm or reverse on the "existing record," but may never remand for
consideration of alternative grounds for affirmance See Pet. Br at 14, 20-22.
Petitioner's claim is contrary to the Utah practice.1
Indeed, both this Court and the court of appeals have remanded for consideration
of alternative grounds for affirmance, including further evidentiary heanng, under
circumstances similar to this case. See, e.g., Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 904
P 2d 677, 685 (Utah 1995) (holding record insufficient to affirm and remanding for
further evaluation by district court); State v. Strain, 779 P 2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989)
(remanding for an evidentiary heanng on possible alternative ground for affirmance, 1 e ,
voluntanness of confession); State v. Marshall, 791 P 2d 880, 889 (Utah App )
(reversing and remanding for c*reheanng"on whether petitioner had standing to contest
the search, a possible alternative ground for affirmance), cert, denied, 800 P 2d 1105
(Utah 1990); State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah App. 1*990) (remanding for
consideration by tnal court of alternative ground for affirmance), cert, denied, 815 P 2d
241 (Utah 1991).
Neither Limb nor Montoya conflicts with the above case law Rather, Limb and
Montoya represent opposite ends of the alternative grounds continuum with Limb

'The State's Bnef of Conditional Cross-Petitioner, infra, contains the State's
alternative argument that the court of appeals could and should have affirmed without
remand
7

representative of cases where the alternative ground is not dependent on trial court
clarification or further fact-finding, but is clear as a matter of law. Limb, 461 P.2d at 293
('There is no disputed issue of fact in this case"). See also Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 LT
61,1 20, 29 P.3d 1225 (affirming on alternative ground apparent as a matter of law).
Montoya, on the other hand, is representative of cases where neither affirmance or
remand for further fact-finding is justified because the alternative grounds for affirmance
are (1) inadequately briefed or (2) clearly rebutted in the record. 937 P.2d at 150. See
Barnett v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 199 (D.C. App. 1987) (declining to affirm on
alternative ground which was unsupported by the undisputed facts).
Here, in contrast to Montoya and Barnett, upon which petitioner primarily relies,
the court of appeals found no inadequacy in the State's briefing, nor did the court of
appeals find the alternative ground was clearly rebutted in the existing record.
Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at f 10-12. In further contrast with Limb, where there
was no disputed issue of fact, 461 P.2d at 293, the search and seizure issue here is factsensitive. Topanotes, 2000 UT 311, f 11-12. Therefore, the court of appeals was
reluctant to affirm without allowing the trial court an opportunity to consider the facts in
light of the alternative ground in the first instance. Id. Remand was thus an appropriate
disposition.
Indeed, this case, along with Renn, Strain, Marshall, and Palmer, fall into an
area between Limb and Montoya on the alternative grounds continuum, where the
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alternate e ground for atfirmance is apparent in the record, but requires turther
clanfication in the trial court In these "in-between,"or generally fact-sensitive cases, the
Ltah practice is to remand for the tnal court to consider the adequacy of an alternative
ground for affirmance in the first instance, which may well entail an additional
evidentian hearing. See, e.g., Strain, 779 P 2d at 227, Palmer, 803 P 2d at 1253,
Marshall, 791 P 2d at 889.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Hodson, 907 P 2d 1155, 1159-60 (Utah 1995),
State v. Case, 884 P 2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App 1994), and State v. Gutierrez, 864 P 2d
894, 903 (Utah App. 1993), is similarly unavailing Petitioner suggests these cases
prohibit the instant remand, see Pet. Br at 21 ("This Court should decide the issues based
on the record the [S]tate chose to create in this matter"), and at 26-27. However, in
neither Hodson, Case, nor Gutierrez did the State argue alternative grounds for
affirmance. Rather, these are cases where the appellate court determined that the State
adduced insufficient evidence to support its winning theory below, and that the State was
not entitled to remand to put on additional evidence supporting its now rejected theory on
appeal : Ibid Thus, Hodson, Case, and Gutierrez fail to support petitioner's claim that
remand is inappropriate here, where the State is asserting a theory different from that
upon which it prevailed below.

defendant's nominal reliance on Ex Parte Hergott, 588 So 2d 911, 916 (Ala
1991), see Pet Br at 29, is distinguishable on the same grounds as Case, Hodson, and
Gutierrez
9

B.

Remand to the Trial Court for a Factual Determination
of Possible Alternative Grounds for Affirmance Does not
Give the State an Unfair Advantage.

Contrary to petitioner's further suggestion, the remand here does not give the
State an unfair advantage, even if the alternative ground for affirmance was raised for the
first time on appeal. See Pet. Br. at 14 ("[R]emand is fundamentally unfair and serves to
provide the [Sjtate with an unprecedented second, or in this case, third, 'bite at the
apple.'"). This Court has previously recognized that affirmance on an alternative ground
"does not depnve a party of a due process," and that it is not a prerequisite of the
doctrine that the alternative ground first be raised in the trial court. DeBry v. Noble, 889
P 2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995); Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61 atf 18 (reaffirming Limb
and emphasizing that it is not a prerequisite of affirmance on alternative grounds that the
alternative ground first be "raised in the lower court") (emphasis in Dipoma). Indeed, if
the State had not prevailed on its "no detention" theory below, and so been the appellant
in the court of appeals, the preservation rule would have precluded the State from
asserting for the first time on appeal that the inevitable discovery rule justified admission
of the heroin See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 774 P 2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (requiring
that the grounds for objection below must be "distinctly and specifically stated'and that a
general motion will not suffice.). As recognized in Montoya, there is a "significant
difference between affirming on appeal and reversing: ;The appellate court will affirm a
judgment on grounds not urged below, but will not rexerse the lower court on errors
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claimed for the first time on appeal/" Id. (quoting Limb, 461 P 2d at 293 n 2) (emphasis
in Montoya).
Finally, if on remand the tnal court determined that further evidentiary hearing
was necessary to address the alternative inevitable discovery theory, petitioner would be
able to cross-examine police thereon. See Pet. Br. at 20 (asserting that because fc*[t]he
state did not argue the issue or present evidence in the tnal court concerning the matter
. [defendant] was not on notice of the possible application of such a unique remedy and
she had no opportunity to cross-examine Officers Hansen or Mitchell in connection with
its possible application.").
C.

Remand for Trial Court Evaluation of Alternative
Grounds for Affirmance is Not Necessarily Limited to the
Existing Record.

In Part II of his brief, petitioner argues that even if the court of appeals' remand
was proper, the tnal court is precluded from holding an additional evidentiary hearing and must evaluate the alternative theory in light of the existing record. Pet. Br. at 22
("Utah appellate courts have specified that remand is limited to the entry of findings
based on the facts already exi[s]ting in the record.") Once again, the cases petitioner
cites do not support her blanket proposition. See Pet. Br. at 22-25.
First, State v. Lopez, 873 P 2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994), Rucker v. Dalton. 598
P2d 1336, 1338-1339 (Utah 1979); State v. Giron, 943 P 2d 1114, 1121 (Utah App
1997), and State v. Genovesi 871 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah App. 1994), do not involve

11

alternatee grounds for affirmance.

Rather, these are cases where the trial court applied

an incorrect legal standard to the facts, or entered inadequate findings. The cases were
thus remanded for the trial courts to evaluate previously admitted evidence under correct
law or to make appropriately detailed findings. Ibid.
Second, petitioner cannot successfully distinguish the remand in Palmer, 803 P.2d
atl253-1254, merely because the alternative ground for affirmance in that case was
raised first in the trial court. See Pet. Br. at 22 (asserting that "if a trial court has
addressed a particular rule of law in the original proceeding but has entered inadequate
findings and the facts of record are in conflict... an appellate court may remand the case
for additional findings'and citing Palmer). In Palmer, the court of appeals expressly
noted that the alternative ground for affirmance in that case—the inevitable discovery
doctrine—had been raised in the trial court, but because the trial court denied the motion
to suppress on another ground, "the trial court did not have to decide the question
whether or not the [contraband] inevitably would have been discovered." Id. at 1253.
The court of appeals observed it could not "properly determine the outcome of a factsensitive issue where the record below is not clear and uncontroverted, or capable of only
one finding." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, Palmer was remanded to the trial court

3

The court of appeals quoted Rucker v. Dalton for its limited observation that
"[i]t is not the function of an appellate court to make findings of fact because it does not
have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses testify.,,, Topanotes, 2000 LT App
311 at II 11 (quoting Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338)).
fc
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tor a ""factual determination^ vv hether the e\ idence "\\ould have ine\ itablv been
discovered and for such other proceedings as may be appropriate " Id. at 1253-1254
Thus, even though the alternative ground for affirmance was raised below m
Palmer, but not m this case, the result is the same: neither trial court considered it
Remand was therefore necessary in Palmer, as it is in this case, to determine whether the
alternative ground could in fact be established. Id. at 1253-1254. Accordingly, the
Palmer remand is no different from the instant remand, or the remand in Mars/tali 791
P 2d at 889, where the alternative ground that Marshall lacked standing was also raised
for the first time on appeal. As previously set forth, Palmer, Marshall, and Topanotes*
along with Renn and Strain comprise an "m-between"category cases where the
alternative ground is not so clearly apparent that the appellate court can affirm without
remand, but neither is the alternative ground so clearly refuted that reversal without
remand is warranted as in Montoya.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals committed no error in ordering a remand, including the
possibility of further evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has not shown that the remand
conflicts with authority from this Court or the court of appeals. Rather, the remand is
consistent with the Utah preference that fact-sensitive alternative grounds for affirmance
be addressed in the trial court in the first instance.
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BRIEF OF CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITIONER

JURISDICTION AiND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Please refer to the Brief of Respondent for the Jurisdiction and Naaire of
Proceedings.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Is remand superfluous because the record is adequate to affirm on the
alternative ground that police would have run a warrants check even without
illegally retaining petitioner's identification and thus discovery of the outstanding
warrants was inevitable?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Please refer to the Brief of Respondent for the Standard of Review
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Please refer to the Brief of Respondent for the Statement of the Case.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Please refer to the Brief of Respondent for the Statement of the Facts
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly recognized that inevitable discovery was an
alternative ground for affirmance here, but erred when it failed to recognize the existing
record was also adequate to affirm without remand Indeed, the uncontro verted ev idence
and pertinent case law establish that a warrants check was routine procedure in this
circumstance and thus could and would have been run with or without retaining
petitioner's identification It was therefore inevitable that police would discover her
outstanding warrants, and that the heroin would be discovered dunng a search incident to
her arrest thereon
ARGUMENT
REMAND IS SUPERFLUOUS BECAUSE THE RECORD IS
ADEQUATE TO AFFIRM ON THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND
THAT POLICE WOULD HAVE RUN A WARRANTS CHECK
EVEN WITHOUT ILLEGALLY RETAINING PETITIONER'S
IDENTIFICATION; THUS, IT WAS INEVITABLE THE
OUTSTANDING WARRANTS WOULD BE DISCOVERED
For reasons set forth in the Brief of Respondent, the State maintains the court of
appeals' remand is consistent with the Utah practice However, in this conditional crosspetition, the State submits that the record is adequate to affirm on the sound alternative
ground of inevitable discovery, thus the instant remand is superfluous Thus, while the
court of appeals correctly recognized that inevitable discovery was an alternative ground

for affirmance here, it erred in failing to recognize the existing record was also adequate
to affirm without remand. See Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at«[«[ 9-12.
A.

The Inevitable Discovery Rule Requires No Absolute
Proof, Beyond Evidence of Predictable Police Routine, of
What Would Have Hypothetically Occurred Absent the
Illegality.

The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of evidence if'"the
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.'" State v.
Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311,«[ 10, 14 P.3d 695 (quoting State v. James 2000 UT 80, «|
16, 13 P 3d 576 (following Nix v. Williams, 467 U S. 431, 444 (1984), and overruling
State v. James, 1999 UT App 17, 977 P.2d 489)). Indeed, the issue in determining
"inevitable discovery" is what would have occurred if the investigation had continued
without the illegality. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 & 459; United States v. Larsen,\ll

F 3d

984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 522 U S. 1140 (1998). Ttjus, the inevitable
discovery rule permits "the prosecution to purge the taint of illegally obtained evidence
by prov mg, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such evidence inevitably would
have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable police investigative
procedures." State v. Miller, 709 P 2d 225, 242 (Ore. 1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 141
(1986). The majority of courts follow the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
requires no absolute proof, beyond evidence of predictable police routine, of what would
have hypothetically occurred absent the illegality Larsen, 127 F 3d at 986.
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As will be demonstrated here, the court of appeals' remand overlooks
uncontroverted evidence that the warrants check here was in fact predictable police
routine.
B.

The Court of Appeals Remand Overlooks
I^controverted Evidence That the Instant Warrants
Check Was Predictable Police Routine.

Here, defendant's encounter with police was initially voluntary and required no
Fourth Amendment justification (see R98:3) (a copy of the trial court's ruling is
contained in addendum B). See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,ffl!9-12, 998
P.2d 274 (h"[A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so
long as the citizen is not detained against his will'") (quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d
616, 617-618 (Utah 1987)). Police can lawfully approach a citizen and request
identification without triggering Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at f 12; State v.
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing as a matter of law that
request for identification cannot convert innocent encounter into a seizure), cert, denied,
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). They can even ask incriminating questions. See Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 & 439 (1991) (acknowledging police can approach
individuals without reasonable suspicion and ask potentially incnminating questions). It
was thus undisputed in the court of appeals that police lawfully obtained petitioner's
identification during the initially voluntary encounter. See Topanotes, 2000 UT App
311 at«[«[7-8.
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Having lawfully obtained petitioner's identification, police properly proceeded to
run a warrants check. See Jackson^ 805 P.2d at 768. As noted by the trial court, a
warrants check can generally be performed at any time on any individual (R88:37).
Indeed, assuming a suspect is not otherwise detained, "[police] may run a warrants check
or make any other use of the information/' Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at f 13 n.2. See also
State v. Navanick, 1999 UT App 265,1fl[ 2-3, 987 P.2d 1276 (pre-detention warrants
check), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000); Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617 (routine
warrants checks during voluntary encounter). Cf. State v. Soukharith, 570 N.W.2d 344,
353 (Neb. 1997) (pre-detention NCIC records check on license plates did not amount to
investigatory stop and therefore did not require reasonable suspicion); State v. Myrick,
659 A.2d 976, 980 (1995) ("reasonably clear that no seizure is involved in the [predetention] check of a license plate number"); State v. Owens, 599 N.E.2d 859, 860 (Ohio
App. 1991) (officer's pre-detention check of motor vehicle records not a Fourth
Amendment violation where it did not interrupt, restrain or detaiif driver); State v.
Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I. 1997) (upholding pre-detention computer check).
Thus, the only mistake police made here was in retaining petitioner's
identification for the duration of the warrants check. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at «|
8 n.3. If police here had merely viewed the identification, obtained the desired
information, and promptly returned it, the warrants check would not have "per se
escalate[d] the encounter into a level two stop/' Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at«[ 13 n.2 (citing
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State v. Higgins 884 P 2d 1242, 1245 n 2 (Ltah 1994)) The initially voluntary
encounter only rose to a detention when police did not promptly return petitioner's
identification (R98 7) Given this circumstance, and the court of appeals' then recently
issued opinion in Ray, the State conceded and the court of appeals agreed, "4a reasonable
person in [petitioner's] position would not feel free to just walk away, thereby
abandoning her identification.'" Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at <[ 8 (quoting Ray, 2000
UT App 55 at H 13)
While the ensuing detention would have been justified if supported by reasonable
suspicion, police made plain below that they did not suspect petitioner of solicitation or
other cnminality when they approached to question her about Thomas, the prostitute they
had just arrested, and whose identity and residence they were attempting to verify (see
R88 16, 28) Therefore, the detention engendered by retaining petitioner's identification
was not justified under the Fourth Amendment Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at % 8 n 3
Notwithstanding the illegal detention, the parties elicited below that the warrants
check was "routine procedure" (R88 16, 22), or "common practice" (R88 27) It is this
uncontroverted and cntical evidence which the court of appeals overlooked in remanding
to the trial court for a "factual determination on whether the heroin would have been
inevitably discovered[ ]" Id. at % 12 Because the warrants check was routine procedure,
police would have conducted the warrants check as part of their investigation and
confirmation of Thomas' residence, regardless of whether petitioner provided them with
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identification (R88:16, 22, 27). See Navanick, 1999 LT App 265 atC€I 2-3 (warrants
check performed based on witness report of defendant's name). See also State v.
Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah App. 1992) (warrants check performed based on
defendant's verbal report of name and date of birth). Therefore, having verified
petitioner's name, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that police could and
would have run the warrants check with or without retaining the identification (R88:16,
22, 27). Police would have thus learned of petitioner's outstanding warrants, even absent
the illegality. See Larsen, 127 F.3d at 986; Miller, 709 P.2d at 242.
In sum, the court of appeals' erred in concluding that it could not affirm on the
existing record, but rather, must remand to the trial court for a "factual determination."
Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at ^f 12. The record facts and pertinent case law clearly
establish that a warrants check in this circumstance was predictable police routine.
Therefore, it was inevitable police would discover petitioner's outstanding warrants even
without her identification (or without the illegality), and that she "Would be arrested
thereon. See Larsen, 127 F.3d at 986. Accordingly, the court of appeals should have
affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress on the alternative ground of inevitable
discovery. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, Iff 17-21, 29 P.2d 1225 C[I]t is well
settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable
on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record'") (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk
Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969). See also State v. Chevre, 2000
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LT App 6, *!*[ 12-13, 994 P.2d 1278 (affirming on alternative ground where record
contained "sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the [alternative ground] to
place [defendant] on notice that the [State] may rely thereon on appeal") (quotation
omitted)).
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals' remand is an unnecessary waste of judicial resources. This
Court should affirm the denial of the motion to suppress on the alternative ground of
inevitable discovery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on _/5january 2002.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

i-r i _u vy.
408LtahAd% Rep N 2000 I T \pp 311
(Cite as: 14 P.3d 695)
H
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Pearl TOPANOTES, Defendant and Appellant.
No 990708-CA.
Nov 9, 2000.
Rehearing Denied Dec 15, 2000.
Defendant was convicted in the District Court, Salt
Lake Department, Leslie A Lewis, J , of third degree
possession of a controlled substance, and defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Thome, J , held that:
(1) officers' detention of defendant during time it took
them to check for outstanding warrants was in
violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights,
and (2) whether police officers' discovery of
defendant's
outstanding
warrants
supported
application of inevitable discovery exception to
exclusionary rule was a question for the trial court,
rather than the Court of Appeals.

Page 1

person has committed or is about to commit a crime,
however, the detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose ot
the stop; and (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed or is being committed. U S C A
Const Amend. 4
[3] Arrest <S=>63 5(9)
35k63 5(9) Most Cited Cases
Police officers did not have a reasonable articulable
suspicion that defendant who was convicted of
possession of a controlled substance had committed
or was about to commit a crime, and thus officers
detention of defendant during time it took them to
check for outstanding warrants was in violation o(
defendant's Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizures, where reasonable person in
defendant's position would not have felt free to just
walk away. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend 4
[4] Criminal Law <§=> 1134(3)
HOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases

Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes

[4] Criminal Law <®=> 1181.5(7)
HOkl 181.5(7) Most Cited Cases

The determination of whether an encounter with law
enforcement officers constitutes a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is a legal conclusion that the
Supreme Court reviews for correctness. U S C.A.
Const Amend. 4.

Whether police officers' discovery of defendant's
outstanding warrants supported application, of
inevitable discovery exception to exclusionary rule
was a question for ihe trial court, rather than the
Court of Appeals, necessitating remand for factual
determination as to whether heroin discovered on
defendant's person would have been inevitably
discovered.

[2] Arrest <$=>63 4(1)
35k63 4( 1) Most Cited Cases

[5] Criminal Law <S=>394 1(3)
110k394 1(3) Most Cited Cases

[2] Arrest <§=>63 5(4)
35k63 5(4) Most Cited Cases

To determine whether evidence obtained as a result of
a violation of the Fourth Amendment can be admitted
at a defendant's trial, the Court of Appeals examines
whether the evidence has been come at by
exploitation of the illegality or by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint
U S C A Const Amend. 4

[1] Criminal Law <S» 1139
HOkl 139 Most Cited Cases

[2] Criminal Law <§=M224(1)
110k 1224(1) Most Cited Cases
Three levels of constitutionally permissible
encounters between police officers and citizens exist:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and
pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained
against his will, (2) an officer may seize a person if
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the

[6] Criminal Law <®=>394 1(3)
110k394 1(3) Most Cited Cases
Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to the
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14 P d6°^
(Cite as- 14 P 3d 695)

Pa^e *

exclusionary rule and the appropriate standard
governing the inevitable discovery ex ption is
whether the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately would have been discovered by lawful
means the state must show that the evidence would
have been discovered, not simply that it could or
might have been discovered U S C A Const Amend
4

*[ 3 Defendant moved to suppress the admission ot
the heroin
The trial court denied the motion and
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, however, she conditioned her plea on the
right to appeal from the trial court's denial ot her
motion
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

[7] Criminal Law <®=> 1181(1)
HOkl 181(1) Most Cited Cases
It is not the function of an appellate court to make
findings of fact because it does not have the
advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses testify,
moreover complete, accurate, and consistent findings
of fact are essential to the resolution of a dispute
under the proper rule of law
*696 Linda M Jones and Ralph Dellapiana, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant

[1] *! 4 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying her motion because the police otficers
conducted a level-two stop without the requisite
articulable suspicion
'[T]he determination ot
whether an encounter with law enforcement otficers
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
is a legal conclusion that we review for correctness '
Salt Lake City v Ray, 2000 UT App 55 «[ 8 998
P 2d 274
ANALYSIS

Jan Graham and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee
Before Judges GREENWOOD, JACKSON, and
THORNE
OPINION
THORNE, Judge
*J 1 Defendant Pearl Topanotes appeals from her
conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp 1999)
We reverse and
remand

BACKGROUND
* 2 On October 7, 1998 three Salt Lake City police
officers detained defendant on a public street and
requested her identification. The officers retained
defendant's identification, outside her presence, for
approximately five minutes to check for outstanding
warrants
The warrant check revealed at least one
outstanding warrant, [FNI] so the officers arrested
defendant The otficers then searched defendant and
found heroin
Defendart was ultimately charged
with possession of a controlled substance
Fx
The nature and amount of the
ou anding vvarrant(s) was not disclosed in
the record

[2] % 5 Three levels of constitutionally permissible
encounters between police officers and citizens exist
(I) an officer may approach a citizen at an'time
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is
not detained against his will, (2) an officer mav
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable
suspicion" that the person has committed or is
about to commit a crime,
however, the
"detention must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to effectuale the purpose ot the
stop," (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an offense
has been committed or is being committed
Id (quoting State v Deitman 739 P 2d 616 617-18
(Utah 1987)) (per curiam) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)
1] 6 We addressed a similar situation in Rax [FN2] In
that case, two police officers approached the
defendant as she stood on a walkwav near a
convenience store See id at *[ 4 The officers asked
for and then retained the defendant's identification to
check for outstanding warrants, a process which took
about five minutes
See id
Before finally
determining the detendant's warrant status one ot the
officers asked to search her bags
See id
The
defendant consented to the search, and the otficer
found drug paraphernalia See id a t c 6 The otficers
then arrested *697 her and charged her with
possessing drug paraphernalia See id at cfl 6-7
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FN2. The Utah Court of Appeals decided
Ray on March 2, 2000, about eight months after the
trial court decided this matter.
H 7 The defendant moved to suppress the admission
of the drug paraphernalia. See id. at U 7.Following a
heanng on the motion, the trial court determined that
the encounter did not violate the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights and denied the motion. See id.
On appeal, we reversed the trial court, explaining that
"[g]iven the totality of the circumstances, it is clear
that a reasonable person in [defendant's] position
would not feel free to just walk away, thereby
abandoning her identification ." See id. at % 13
(emphasis added).
[3] H 8 In the present matter, after examining the
"totality of the circumstances" surrounding the
encounter between the officers and defendant, we
believe that "a reasonable person in [defendant's]
position would not feel free to just walk away,
thereby abandoning her identification."
Id.
Accordingly, we conclude that the detention was a
level two detention made without articulable
suspicion in violation of defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights. [FN3]
FN3. The State concedes, on appeal, in light
of Ray, that by failing to immediately return
defendant's
identification
card, the
encounter escalated to a level-two detention.
The State also concedes that the police
officers had no "articulable suspicion" that
defendant had "committed or was about to
commit a crime," and therefore the
detention was a seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
R][5] H 9 We must next address whether the
evidence resulting from the violation can be admitted
at defendant's trial. Thus, we examine " 'whether ...
the evidence has been come at by exploitation of [the]
illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.' " State v. Northrup,
756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (quoting
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). Furthermore, we
must "determine whether the [search of Topanotes]
fall[s] within the recognized limited exceptions to the

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement." State v.
Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah Ct.App. 1995).
[6] U 10 The State argues that the officer's discovery
of defendant's outstanding warrants supports the
application of the inevitable discovery exception to
this case. Inevitable discovery is a valid exception to
the exclusionary rule, see State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d
1288, 1293 (Utah Ct.App. 1988), and "[t]he
appropriate standard governing the inevitable
discovery exception is whether 'the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately would have been discovered
by lawful means.'" State v. James, 2000 UT 80, H 16,
405 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377
(1984)). More precisely, the State " 'must show that
the evidence 'would' have been discovered, not
simply that it "could" or "might" have been
discovered.' " M.V. v. State, 1999 UT App 104,11 12,.
977 P.2d 494 (quoting Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 923 n.
8) (alterations in original).
[7] 1| 11 Because the trial court ruled that the initial
detention was legal, the issue of inevitable discovery
was not addressed below. "This court has consistently
recognized that [issues of search and seizure] are
highly fact sensitive," State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d
767, 770 (Utah Ct.App. 1990), and "[i]t is not the
function of an appellate court to make findings of fact
because it does not have the advantage of seeing or
hearing the witnesses testify." Rucker v. Dalton, 598
P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utab 1979). Moreover, "complete,
accurate[,] and consistent findings of fact ... [are]
essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper
rule of law." Id.
U 12 Therefore, we remand for a factual
determination on whether the heroin would have been
inevitably discovered and for such proceedings as
may be appropriate.
H 13 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Associate Presiding Judge.
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 981920853 SF

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.

(Videotape Proceedings)

PEARL TOPANOTES,
Defendant.
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of July,
1999, commencing at the hour of 9:55 a.m., the aboveentitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE
LESLIE LEWIS, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court
for the purpose of this cause, and that the following
videotape proceedings were had.
-oOo-

A P P E A R A H C E S
For the State:

MARK KOURIS
Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

For the Defendant:

RALPH DELLAPIANA
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender

Association
424 East^500 South, Suite 300
S a l t LaH*;cit5r Utah- 84AU
2000
i
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ORIGINAL
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-34

FEE

f

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DELLAPIANA:

I think she

pronounces it Topanotes.
THE COURT:

Topanotes.

Thank you.

I

probably won't get it right anyway; but Topanotes.
And it's 981920853, 9919199392.

In the latter

case, she's charged with a Class B misdemeanor of
mischievous conduct, I've never seen it couched that way.
Mischievous conduct?
categorizes it?

Is that how the City

I would have thought it would be

disorderly, or...
In any event, and the other one is illegal
possession of a controlled substance, a third-degree.
The defendant has joined us.

Good morning, Ms.

Topanotes.
MS. TOPANOTES:
THE COURT:

Good morning.

And I'll note for the

record that Mr. Dellapiana is here on her behalf.

The

State is represented.
And I've had an opportunity to consider by way
of what has been submitted by way of written product on
the motion to suppress and am prepared to rule on that.
I also have taken into account and carefully
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stop and the more serious Level Two stop obviously is
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predicated upon articulable suspicion to justify the

3

stop.

4

point, because I think this stops short of a Level Two

5

stop.

In this case, I don't believe we get to that

6

The law is clear that whether one is in an

7

automobile or on foot, the police have the right to stop

8

someone in a Level One manner> for a short,

9 J

identification-type search; merely to ask the person who

10

they are.

11

consensual, short-term encounter and that there is no

12

seizure, that is to say, arrest or detention beyond the

13

person's will.

14

This is permissible, as long as it is a purely

The distinction appears to depend upon whether

15

there is any kind of actual arrest or any kind of

16

physical force or authority exerted or whether the other

17

person believes his or her freedom of increment is

18

restrained.

19

State vs. Rameriz. is clearly an objective standard and

20

it's dependent on whether the defendant remained

21

cooperatively or because she believed she was not free to

22

leave.

23

But the standard, and this is clear under

In this case, based upon all the testimony

24

adduced, this Court finds that there was absolutely no

25

testimony that she was compelled to remain, but rather,
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three officers in the general vicinity when Ms. Topanotes
was stopped, to characterize this as three officers
surrounding her appears to be belied by the facts.
While it's a very good argument and if it had
been supported by the facts, it might be more compelling
to the Court.

This Court finds that the testimony, as I

recall, was that three never did surround her, that there
were three in the general vicinity but only one directly
dealing with her and another one sort of close by.
the third, quite some distance away.

And

And that there was

no attempt to surround her or give her the impression her
liberty had been restricted.
Further, the Court notes that under state vs.
vatiinaluna, the appellate case from 1992, and State vg»
Hansenr the Court feels that this ruling is appropriate.
Although it is not an automobile-type seizure and of
course, most of the case law goes to th|tt, the Court
feels that the basic underlying rationale in all of the
cases that look at Level One and Level Two stops, needs
to be considered in this case as well.
The Court has also considered State v. Jackson,
the appellate case from 1990, which had wonderful
language in it that I will repeat, which I believe is
helpful in making the assessment.
That case, at Page 768, stated, quote, "A
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Further, the testimony and I cannot with
specificity point to the exact time, but I believe an
officer said five minutes or less was the time of her
actual stay with the police officers while they did her
identification check, or the warrants check on the
identification provided.
Again, there has been no testimony supportive
of a weapon exhibited or used by the police, no testimony
of any touching of her in any way to make her feel
intimidated or stop her from moving forward in a physical
manner, no angry voices, inappropriate language or rough
tone has been attested to; on the contrary, the Court has
made the observations already noted.
She is briefly questioned, in no way detained
against her will.

The Court can find nothing to suggest

a confrontational aspect of this encounter.

The mere

presence of the police officer and their Request—
officers and their request for identification is not
sufficient to escalate this to a Level Two Terry stop.
Over all, there was no evidence that the
defendant raised any objection, either by her demeanor or
any kind of non-verbal display or verbally to the
provision of her identification or the warrants check.
And for these reasons, the Court denies the
motion to suppress.
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